Zelenskyy's Victory Plan - Russian Invasion of Ukraine DOCUMENTARY
Table of contents
- The battlefield in Ukraine is a game of inches, where every advance is hard-fought and every setback is a lesson in resilience.
- In the ongoing battle for control, both sides are facing significant challenges, but the struggle for manpower and morale could be the game-changer in this conflict.
- The struggle for military readiness and morale on both sides highlights the harsh reality of modern warfare, where numbers alone can't guarantee success.
- The shifting alliances in the Ukraine conflict reveal a complex web of military support, with China quietly backing Russia while Western nations ramp up aid to Ukraine.
- In a world where neutrality can profit from conflict, countries like India navigate the complex web of war, arms, and diplomacy while Ukraine fights for survival and support.
The battlefield in Ukraine is a game of inches, where every advance is hard-fought and every setback is a lesson in resilience.
In September, Russia continued making important advances in several sectors of the battlefield. Ukraine is still struggling to contain the Russian offensive, which has been ongoing for almost a year. All this is happening while Putin engages in another round of nuclear sabre-rattling, and as Zelensky is working hard to maintain a pro-Ukrainian bipartisan coalition in the United States on the eve of crucial presidential elections. A lot has happened regarding the war in Ukraine in September, so it is advisable to watch this video.
BATTLEFIELD
Capturing Pokrovsk continues to appear as the primary focus of Russian offensive operations. In September, most of the fighting in this sector took place in the South. Previously, the Russian army made rapid gains, reaching the Hrodivka-Novohrodivka-Selydove line. There were rumblings of an impending collapse of the Ukrainian front in this sector, but in September, the situation was stabilized. The Russian army captured Krasnyi Yar and made some gains in Hrodivka and Novohrodivka, along with the M30 highway. However, overall in the central and northern axes of the Pokrovsk sector, the situation has remained largely unchanged. Most of the fighting had been going on in the Southern sector. Here, the Russian army has failed to make any meaningful advance westwards but has significantly expanded their area of control to the South. The purpose of these operations was to widen the salient to the South in order to minimize the risk of Ukrainian flanking attacks. Another aim may be moving southwards on Kurakhove, another tactically important town in Donbas. The Russian army has already been moving on Kurakhove from the east and is currently fighting in Maksymilianivka. The southwards movement from the Pokrovsk sector creates a potential threat on Kurakhove from the North as well.
On this axis, Russians completed the capture of Krasnohorivka and then moved westwards on Hostre, capturing this village at the end of September. In the Southern axis of the Pokrovsk sector, Russians advanced too. On September 1, they captured Mykhailivka and Dolynivka. At this point, there were reports about a potential encirclement of the elements of the 59th, 68th, 117th Brigades and the 15th Brigade defending the line between Memryk and the river Vovche, which could have been bypassed by numerically superior Russian forces. However, the situation was somewhat stabilized when the 15th Kara-Dag Brigade of the National Guard, the 93rd Mechanized Brigade, and the 12th Special Operations Azov Brigade were deployed in this sector. On September 7, they stopped the Russian advance west of Mykhailivka at the entrance of Selydove. Consequently, the Russians decided to move southwards. On September 9, they captured Memryk and Halytstinivka. Following this, they captured Lisivka, Zhelanne Pershe, Ukrainsk, and Zhelanne Druhe.
Earlier, we reported the intensification of Russian offensive efforts in the Vuhledar sector. This time, instead of attacking Ukrainian fortifications head-on, Russians decided to target the flanks of Vuhledar. In August, the Russian army took control of a portion of the O0532 Highway east of Vodyane, effectively cutting one of the supply lines to Vuhledar. In early September, they advanced on Vyimka in the Northeast and along the river Kashlahach, entering Prechystivka in the west. On September 8, they captured Vodiane. On September 21, Russians crossed the Kashlahach river and advanced some 4 km Northwards, creating a significant threat of encirclement of Vuhledar. The fighting has already started inside the city, and it looks like the fate of this battle is sealed. Russians enjoy a manpower advantage in the Vuhledar sector, with only the C051134 highway remaining as the supply line for the Ukrainian forces inside the town. Vuhledar is the most important stronghold of the Ukrainian army in this area, and losing it creates an opportunity for the Russian army to attempt a truly mechanized breakthrough through the open fields. Ukraine reportedly lacks significant defensive structures beyond Vuhledar in a flat area with minimal vegetation. However, if this war has taught us something, it is that Russians are not good at mechanized breakthroughs. Instead, they may choose to continue employing the tactic of careful, but costly infantry attacks.
Elsewhere in Donbas, Ukrainians have largely stood their ground. In the Chasiv Yar sector, the fighting is still largely ongoing along the Sivereski Donets canal. The only area where the Russian army has been able to establish a permanent foothold beyond the canal is in the south, outside of the town limits. The most notable development in this sector was the completion of the capture of Hryhorivka to the north of Chasiv Yar, but here the Russians are beyond the canal too. A few months ago, Chasiv Yar seemed like the key area of focus of the Russian offensive. However, whether due to the shift of focus to the Pokrovsk offensive in order to capitalize on earlier breakthroughs, or due to the inability to cross the canal, or perhaps due to the Ukrainian advantage of controlling the dominant heights in Chasiv Yar, the Russians have not had much success in this area yet.
In the Toretsk sector, battles are currently ongoing.
In the ongoing battle for control, both sides are facing significant challenges, but the struggle for manpower and morale could be the game-changer in this conflict.
In the Chasiv Yar sector, the fighting is still largely ongoing along the Sivereski Donets canal. The only area where the Russian army has been able to establish a permanent foothold beyond the canal is in the south, outside of the town limits. The most notable development in this sector was the completion of the capture of Hryhorivka to the north of Chasiv Yar, but here the Russians are also beyond the canal. A few months ago, Chasiv Yar seemed like the key area of focus of the Russian offensive. However, whether due to a shift of focus to the Pokrovsk offensive to capitalize on earlier breakthroughs, an inability to cross the canal, or perhaps the Ukrainian advantage of controlling the dominant heights in Chasiv Yar, the Russians have not had much success in this area yet.
In the Toretsk sector, battles are currently taking place inside the city. The Russians are slowly grinding their way inside Toretsk, but urban battles are difficult, so it may take weeks before Russia can claim full control of Toretsk. Outside of Toretsk, the Azov battalion managed to break the encirclement of a pocket of resistance in Niu York in early September, restoring some of the earlier lost positions.
In the Kharkiv oblast, the front is barely moving. The only meaningful development here was the liberation of the ruins of the Aggregate Plant in Vovchansk. Earlier, there was talk about the encirclement of a Russian unit inside the plant, and on September 24, the HUR special forces liberated it, taking around 20 Russians prisoners in the process. At this point, it looks like the Russian command has deprioritized the Kharkiv front and is focusing their offensive potential on other fronts.
The situation on the Kupiansk-Svatove front is quickly deteriorating for the Ukrainians. During the Ukrainian autumn 2022 counteroffensive, they managed to cross the Oskil river and liberate large swathes of land up to the P66 highway. Since then, the Russians have recaptured the strategic initiative on this front and have been constantly attacking here for more than a year. In August, they finally started making serious gains, advancing on the line from Synkivka in the north to Nevske in the south. This development is creating a significant threat to the Ukrainian bridgehead on the east of the Oskil river. The Russian movement suggests that they may be targeting the village of Kruhlyakivka. Success here will cut the Ukrainian bridgehead in half, creating problems for their logistics on the Kupiansk-Svatove front.
Both sides continue attacking in the Kursk oblast. In early September, Ukrainians expanded their area of control around the 38K-024 highway, capturing Pogrebki, Maryevka, and Orlovka. However, on September 9, the Russians attempted a counteroffensive on the Kursk front. Elements of the 106th VDV Division and the 155th Naval Infantry Brigade took Olgovka, Snagost, Krasnooktyabrskoye, Komarovka, Vishnevka, Obukhovka, Byakhovo, and several other villages after launching an attack from Korenevo.
To provide some context about the Ukrainian actions in the Kursk oblast, after an initial success, the frontline had generally stabilized. The most notable action after the first days was the destruction of bridges over the river Seym, making the logistics of the Russian army in the Gluskhovo area extremely challenging. Many expected Ukraine to strike in this area, but they lingered, anticipating a Russian counter-attack to relieve the troops in Gluskhovo. On September 11, the 116th Brigade launched their own attack to move into the rear of the Russian forces in Snagost. Ukrainians advanced through the border on Veseloye, and another incursion was attempted through Tyotkino. However, the lack of coordination between the units prevented the Ukrainians from executing their plan and encircling the Russian grouping in Snagost. Heavy fighting is still ongoing here and in other parts of the Kursk front. Ukrainians are still fighting to keep the pressure on Korenevo, and in September, they captured Durovka, Zhuravli, and Kremyanoe, while the Russians are trying to get closer to Sudzha. During this period, they retook Borki from the Ukrainian army.
One of the causes of Ukraine’s troubles on the battlefield is insufficient manpower, which has been discussed multiple times. The head of the defense committee of the Ukrainian parliament, Oleksandr Zavitnevich, has claimed that the impact of the newly mobilized soldiers will be felt in about 3 months. A report from the Financial Times cites a senior Ukrainian official suggesting that about 30k new soldiers per month have been mobilized since May. However, the experienced Ukrainian soldiers complain about their battle readiness and morale. Unnamed commanders fighting in Donbas claim that 50-70% of newly recruited infantrymen have been killed or wounded. While this may be an exaggeration, the decision of the commander in chief, Syrsky, to extend the basic training for the mobilized from 3 months to longer is an indirect acknowledgment of the lack of preparedness of new soldiers. Meanwhile, the Kremlin is also grappling with a politically difficult issue of further mobilization. According to the Wall Street Journal, the minister of defense is pushing for additional measures.
The struggle for military readiness and morale on both sides highlights the harsh reality of modern warfare, where numbers alone can't guarantee success.
The defense committee of the Ukrainian parliament has been actively discussing the impact of newly mobilized soldiers. Oleksandr Zavitnevich has claimed that the impact of the newly mobilized soldiers will be felt in about 3 months. According to a report by the Financial Times, a senior Ukrainian official suggested that about 30k new soldiers per month have been mobilized since May. However, experienced Ukrainian soldiers have expressed concerns regarding their battle readiness and morale. Unnamed commanders fighting in Donbas have reported that 50-70% of newly recruited infantrymen have been killed or wounded. While this figure may be an exaggeration, the decision by Commander-in-Chief Syrsky to extend the basic training for the mobilized soldiers from 3 months to longer serves as an indirect acknowledgment of the lack of preparedness of new soldiers.
On the other hand, the Kremlin is also facing a politically challenging issue regarding further mobilization. The Wall Street Journal reports that the minister of defense is pushing Putin for another round of mobilization, but Putin has been trying to avoid this, opting instead to rely on the recruitment of contract soldiers. Despite the Russian army making gains in Ukraine, they require more soldiers to maintain their current pace of attack, especially considering the losses they have been experiencing.
In terms of military strategy, both sides are engaging in asymmetric warfare to undermine each other's capacity and resolve to continue fighting. This is primarily executed through long-range strikes on military and civilian infrastructure. On September 3, Russians launched two Iskander missiles on the Poltava Military Communications Institute, resulting in the deaths of dozens of Ukrainian soldiers. Additionally, they have conducted regular Shahed drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure throughout September. According to Forbes, Russia is producing 500 Shahed drones, 90-115 cruise missiles, and 56 ballistic missiles per month. The domestic production and the delivery of ballistic missiles from North Korea and Iran have enabled Russia to sustain a regular pace of strikes on Ukraine, which the country's air defense systems are currently incapable of countering. Ukraine lacks a sufficient number of air defense systems to intercept all the drones and missiles targeting it. The last reported delivery from Iran included 200-220 Fath-360 ballistic missiles with a range of 110-120 km.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has executed what may be its most significant long-range strike on Russia during this period. On September 18, drones, or according to some speculations, the new locally produced Palianytsia drones/missiles, were launched at the 107th rocket-artillery depot near Toropets. Reports indicate that Russians had stored up to 30,000 tons of Iskander, Tochka U missiles, KAB glide bombs, Grad rockets, and other assets at this location. Although this information is difficult to verify, Estonian intelligence has claimed that Russia lost 2-3 months' worth of ammunition in this strike. Additionally, Ukrainian drones destroyed two other ammunition depots on September 20 in Tikhorets and Oktyabrsky. It is important to note that Ukraine is conducting these attacks with domestically produced weapons, as the United States still does not permit the use of its long-range missiles on Russian soil. The Biden administration believes that granting such permission would lead to an escalation with Russia without providing significant advantages to Ukraine. Putin is aware of this sentiment and is ensuring that the Americans do not alter their stance. In September, he stated that the permission to use American and Western long-range weapons on Russian soil would mean that the United States, NATO, and European countries are in a direct war with Russia, which would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict. He further emphasized the necessity to alter the Russian nuclear doctrine, reminding everyone of Russia's nuclear capabilities. While the use of nuclear weapons by Russia remains highly unlikely, there are other potential avenues for escalation that could cause trouble for the West. Military analyst Michael Kofman speculates that Russia might provide anti-ship missiles to the Houthis in Yemen, thereby expanding their capacity to damage maritime shipping.
In a related development, it is noteworthy that, according to Reuters, Russia may indeed intend to pursue this course of action. Iran has reportedly brokered secret negotiations between the Kremlin and the Houthis regarding the delivery of Russian P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles. Currently, Iran stands as Russia's chief military ally, but both Ukrainian and Western governments are raising alarms about increasing support from China to Russia. On September 10, the US Deputy Secretary of State Campbell informed Politico that China is sending resources vital for domestic military production in exchange for military technology. Subsequently, on September 13, Reuters cited European intelligence sources and leaked documents indicating that Russia has been producing Garpiya-A1 attack drones, which are equipped with Chinese engines. According to Reuters, Russia has produced more than 2,500 Garpiya-A1 drones, which have a range of 1,500 km between July 2003 and July 2024. Furthermore, Russians are reportedly testing Garpiya-3 attack drones with a range of 2,000 kilometers, which also contain Chinese components. Ukrainian official Vladyslav Vlasyuk has expressed concerns regarding these developments.
The shifting alliances in the Ukraine conflict reveal a complex web of military support, with China quietly backing Russia while Western nations ramp up aid to Ukraine.
of the Russian P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missiles. Iran remains the chief military ally of Russia at the moment, but both the Ukrainian and Western governments and sources raise the alarm regarding increasing support by China to Russia. On September 10, the US Deputy Secretary of State Campbell told Politico that China is sending resources vital for domestic military production in exchange for military technology.
Then, on September 13, Reuters cited European intelligence sources and leaked documents claiming that Russia has been producing Garpiya-A1 attack drones, which have Chinese engines. According to Reuters, Russia has produced more than 2500 Garpiya-A1 drones, which have a range of 1500 km between July 2003 and July 2024. Russians are also reportedly testing Garpiya-3 attack drones with a range of 2000 kilometers, which also has Chinese parts. Ukrainian official Vladyslav Vlasyuk claimed on September 23 that China provides almost 60% of all foreign components found in weapons used by Russia in Ukraine. Beijing is denying these allegations and is still positioning itself as a neutral party in this war, but it is more than clear that they are helping Russia at this point. Putin claimed in September that Russia will produce 1.4 million drones in 2024 and perhaps the aforementioned drones are among them.
Meanwhile, despite delays and criticism by Ukraine, its Western allies continue making military aid pledges and deliveries. The German Chancellor Scholz announced that they will deliver 17 Iris-T air defense systems to Ukraine by 2026. Then the German defense minister Pistorius informed about a 150 million euros military aid package, which included 12 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled howitzers. Six of them will be delivered in 2024. Another important pledge is 77 Leopard 1A5 tanks, which will be delivered as soon as possible. Berlin has also reportedly delivered 60k 155-mm artillery shells, 5 Bandvagn 206 vehicles, 2 TRML-4d air defense radars, machine guns, and small arms ammunition. Lastly, on September 25, Germany announced 70 million euros of aid to support the Ukrainian energy infrastructure in the winter. Along with that, the German Bundestag stated a 400 million euros increase of military aid to Ukraine. Germany continues making crucial military aid to Ukraine, strongly entrenching itself as the second biggest donor of the Ukrainian army.
The largest donor, the United States, has made several important pledges too, despite a strong domestic opposition. On September 6, the Pentagon announced a 250 million dollar aid consisting of Rim-7 anti-aircraft missile systems; Stinger missiles, 105-mm and 155-mm artillery shells, TOW missiles, Bradley and M113 vehicles, and HIMARS ammunition. On September 11, the State Secretary Blinken announced a 700 million dollar aid, which includes additional air defense systems. On September 25, the Pentagon made another pledge of 375 million dollars with more artillery shells, HIMARS ammunition, Javelin and AT-4 anti-tank guns, M1117 armored vehicles, MRAP vehicles, and other tools among the highlights. Finally, President Biden announced additional funding of 8 billion USD for Ukraine, along with an expanded training program for F-16 fighter jets.
Other allies have also made notable pledges. Romania delivered the earlier promised Patriot system. On September 6, during the Rammstein meeting, Britain pledged 650 Lightweight Multirole Missiles to be delivered by the end of 2024. Canada promised CRV-7 rocket motors, 1300 unspecified warheads, hundreds of machine guns and small arms, along with dozens of decommissioned armored personnel carriers, which can be used for spare parts. The Netherlands announced 80 million euros worth of equipment and air-to-air missiles for F-16s. On September 9, Sweden pledged 443 million dollars worth of ammunition, patrol boats, missiles, and money to facilitate a transfer of Gripen fighter jets in the future.
On September 11, Britain pledged more than 600 million pounds of military aid to Ukraine, which included air defense missiles, shells and ammunition, and armored vehicles. On the same day, Croatia announced a 200 million dollar aid, while Latvia promised to give 0.25% of its GDP to Ukraine in 2025. On September 16, the Polish Foreign Minister Sikorskiy announced that Poland was going to join the Czech initiative of artillery shells procurement for Ukraine. They are planning to allocate 50 million euros this year and 50 million euros next year to support this initiative.
Speaking of the Czech initiative, the media cites Indian and European officials claiming that India has been the mysterious provider of shells to Ukraine. They have been selling empty shells to Italy and Czechia, which filled them with explosives and then transferred to Ukraine. India has always acted neutral in this war. They have been buying Russian oil for a good price, indirectly helping the Kremlin to fund its war in Ukraine. And then apparently they have been selling shells indirectly to Ukraine. For countries like India, who do not have a vested interest in a faraway war, such wars create an opportunity to profit and potentially boost their military exports.
On September 20, the European Commission president von der Leyen announced two loan packages worth 80 billion Euros for Ukraine.
In a world where neutrality can profit from conflict, countries like India navigate the complex web of war, arms, and diplomacy while Ukraine fights for survival and support.
This year, 50 million euros are planned to be allocated to support a specific initiative, with an additional 50 million euros earmarked for the following year. Speaking of the Czech initiative, the media cites Indian and European officials claiming that India has been the mysterious provider of shells to Ukraine. Reports indicate that India has been selling empty shells to Italy and Czechia, which then filled them with explosives before transferring them to Ukraine. Throughout this conflict, India has maintained a stance of neutrality, continuing to purchase Russian oil at favorable prices, thereby indirectly assisting the Kremlin in funding its war efforts in Ukraine. Furthermore, it appears that India has been indirectly selling shells to Ukraine. For countries like India, which do not have a vested interest in a distant war, such conflicts present opportunities for profit and the potential to enhance their military exports.
On September 20, the European Commission president von der Leyen announced two loan packages worth 80 billion euros for Ukraine. This funding will be utilized for the purchase of domestically produced weapons and to support Ukraine’s embattled energy infrastructure. Earlier, Ukraine’s defense minister Umerov claimed that Ukraine will be able to produce 20 billion dollars worth of weapons if it secures the necessary funding. Ukraine has been actively manufacturing drones, armored vehicles, and other military assets. Most recently, the former minister of military industry, Kamyshin, claimed that Ukraine has started producing crucial 155-mm artillery shells.
In a related note, the Australian media, specifically the Sydney Morning Herald, reported that the Australian government is seeking US permission to transfer 59 mothballed M1A1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine. However, the US government has not authorized this transfer and does not seem inclined to do so. This situation is quite perplexing, as the perceived threat of escalation does not seem to justify the reluctance, especially since the Americans have already sent a limited number of 31 of the same tanks. Perhaps the United States aims to avoid any negative publicity regarding its weapons and military vehicles. Footage of destroyed American tanks could be detrimental to business; however, in the context of war, tanks are meant to fight, destroy, and inevitably get destroyed. Thus, Ukraine can surely use a few dozen old yet operational tanks.
DIPLOMATIC DEVELOPMENTS
Simultaneously, Ukraine is diligently working on the diplomatic front to strengthen its position. The second round of the Ukraine-organized peace summit is scheduled for November. There have been calls from Ukraine’s allies, including German Chancellor Scholz in September, to invite Russia to the summit. On September 13, President Zelensky confirmed that Russia will indeed be invited to the second peace summit; however, statements from several Russian officials suggest a lack of interest in participating. Keeping the United States engaged remains a crucial aspect of Ukraine’s defense strategy. Losing US military support would make it nearly impossible for the Ukrainian army to sustain its defense. Therefore, Zelensky traveled to the United States to meet with President Biden and Republican nominee Donald Trump to ensure the continuation of American support while pitching his Victory Plan.
Although Zelensky’s Victory Plan has not been publicly disclosed, media reports and interviews indicate it includes several key components. The first is guaranteeing Ukraine’s membership in NATO. While Western leaders have expressed supportive sentiments regarding Ukraine’s accession, no firm guarantees have been provided. It remains unlikely that Ukraine will be admitted to NATO while engaged in a war with Russia, as Western leaders are wary of direct involvement in such a conflict. The second component of the Victory Plan involves seeking permission to use Western-made long-range missiles on Russia. Thus far, the United States has been hesitant to grant this permission, at least publicly. There are rumors suggesting that the West may be prepared to allow this but prefers to maintain a degree of ambiguity on the matter.
The third element of the Victory Plan is the continued military and economic support for Ukraine. While Western leaders have made reassuring statements about supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes,” there has been considerable criticism regarding delays and hesitance in the Western policy of providing military aid, particularly from the United States. Kyiv has had to exert significant effort to persuade its allies to send new categories of weapons. For instance, it took months for the US to agree to send HIMARS, and over a year for the West to finally consent to send a few dozen tanks. The same pattern has been observed regarding long-range missiles and F-16s. Although Western military aid has enabled the Ukrainian army to continue its fight, it remains uncertain how much longer the West will provide weapons to Ukraine. Lastly, EU membership appears to be the most realistic goal of Ukraine’s Victory Plan at this time. Ukraine became a candidate member in June 2022, and barring any extraordinary developments, it is expected to become an EU member in the foreseeable future.
It seems that the Biden administration was not overly impressed by the Victory Plan and has requested Ukraine to present a realistic picture of its goals in this war. Relations with Trump are even more complex, as military aid to Ukraine has been a source of criticism from his supporters for months. During Zelensky’s visit, Trump mocked the Ukrainian president’s requests for increased military support, stating that the United States would withdraw from the war in Ukraine if he were to become president. He has also expressed confidence in his ability to broker a deal between Zelensky and Putin without elaborating on what such a deal might entail. Trump later met with Zelensky and expressed respect for the Ukrainian president; however, it is challenging to expect him to be more supportive of Ukraine than the Biden administration if he wins the election.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while there have been increased diplomatic efforts in recent months, there is little indication that the war will end soon. Ukraine and Russia remain far apart in their visions of a fair deal. However, fatigue is becoming a significant factor for both sides. Even the Russian public, which previously seemed supportive or indifferent toward the war, may be shifting its attitude. A recent poll indicated that 63% of Russians are in favor of signing a peace deal by making mutual concessions. Nonetheless, there is no indication that the most important person in Russia, Putin, intends to pursue this course of action.
To summarize the equipment losses suffered by both sides in this war, according to the Oryx blog, as of September 30, Russia has lost at least 3424 tanks, 7662 vehicles, 290 command posts and communication stations, 1374 artillery systems and vehicles, 422 multiple rocket launchers, 128 aircraft, and 145 helicopters. In contrast, Ukraine has lost at least 944 tanks, 3026 vehicles, 23 command posts and communication stations, 654 artillery systems and vehicles, 78 multiple rocket launchers, 100 aircraft, and 49 helicopters. Further updates on the War in Ukraine are forthcoming. To ensure you don’t miss them, please subscribe and press the bell button. We encourage you to like, subscribe, comment, and share, as it helps immensely. Recently, we have started releasing weekly patron and YouTube member exclusive content; consider joining their ranks via the link in the description or the button under the video to access these weekly videos, learn about our schedule, gain early access to our content, and enjoy access to our private Discord. This is the Kings and Generals channel, and we will catch you on the next one.